In this paper, we describe some weaknesses of public-key blockwise fragile authentication watermarkings and the means to make them secure. Wong's original algorithm is not secure against a mere block cut-and-paste or the well-known birthday attack. To make it secure, some schemes have been proposed to make the signature of each block depend on the contents of its neighboring blocks. We attempt to maximize the change localization resolution using only one dependency per block with a scheme we call hash block chaining version 1 (HBC1). We then show that HBC1, as well as any neighbor-dependent scheme, are susceptible to another forgery technique that Re have named a transplantation attack. We also show a new kind of birthday attack that can be effectively mounted against HBC 1. To thwart these attacks, we propose using a nondeterministic digital signature together with a signaturedependent scheme (HBC2). Finally, we discuss the advantages of using discrete logarithm signatures instead of RSA for watermarking.
INTRODUCTION
A digital watermark i.3 a visually imperceptible, informationcarrying signal embedded in a digital image. A watermarking scheme can be classified as either robu~t orfragile. Robust watermarks are generally used for copyright and ownership verification. In comparison, fragile watermarks are useful for purposes of authentication and integrity attestation. A fragile watermark provides a guarantee that tlie image has not been tampered with and came from the right soiirce. Many fragile watermarking schemes have been proposed, for example [l-31. Among them, Wong has proposed using a public-key based digital signature scheme [l-21. Using a public-key cipher, claims of image authenticity can be judged without the necessity of disclosing any private information. Moreover, solid cryptography theory makes this scheme reliable, when due cares are taken into account. The present paper will discuss what these "due cares" are.
A digital signature [?, section 1.61 is an algorithm for ensuring integrity and authenticily of sensitive digital data. It computes a fingerprint of the data by using a hashing function, and then employs an asymmetric (public-key) cipher to encrypt the fingerprint with the originator's private-key. In the signature verification step, the hashing function is applied on the received data and the accompanying signature is decrypted using the signer's public-key. The results are expected to match, unless the data or signature are corrupted or faked.
The ability to localixe where the alterations have taken place is obviously a desirable property. Classical digital signatures are able to detect alterations in signed data but not to locate them. Wong proposed dividing an image into blocks and independently signing each block. The signature is then embedded in the least significant bit (LSB) of every pixel in the image. This scheme makes it possible to localize where the alterations are situated, but it presents many flaws. One of such flaws is its weakness against the "birthday attack," as pointed out by Holliman and Memon [5] and, independently, by ourselves [6-71. Wong's scheme is also insecure against a mere block cut-and-paste attack (see figure 2) .
The works [5-71 conclude that the use of contextual information can mend some of the weaknesses of blockwise-independent watermarking schemes. Using contextual information, the signature of a block is considered valid only if it is surrounded by correct blocks (see figure 1 ). In this case, if a block B is changed, the signature verification will fail in all those blocks that depend on B. Thus, a number as small as possible of dependencies is desirable for an accurate localization of image changes. In the present paper, we propose making the signature of each block depend on only one other block, in order to maximize the change localization resolution. We call this scheme hash block chaining, version 1 (HBCl), reminiscent of the cipher block chaining construction [4, algorithm 7.131. Holliman and Memon [5] did not notice that any contextdependent scheme (including HBC 1) is susceptible to another kind of forgery technique that we call a transplanfation affack. Moreover, although a classic birthday attack cannot be performed against HBC1, we will present a new improved birthday attack that can effectively be mounted against HBC1. We will show that an improved form of hash block chaining, HBC2, which makes use of nondeterministic digital signature and signature-dependency, can prevent these kinds of attack.
WONG'S SCHEME
Wong's scheme for watermark insertion in a grayscale image can be summarized as follows:
1. Let Z be an NxM image to be watermarked. Partition Z into n blocks Z, (0 5 t < n ) of 8x8 pixels (at most; border blocks may be shorter). Each Z, will be watermarked separately.
2. Let A be a visually meaningful binary image to be used as watermark. This image is replicated periodically to get an image large enough to cover Z. To each block Z, there will be a corresponding binary block AI. The corresponding watermark verification algorithm is straigh tfonvard:
1. Let X be an NxM watermarked image. Partition this image into n blocks X,, as before.
2. Let X l be the block obtained from X, by clearing the LSB of all pixels. Using the hashing function H chosen for insertion, compute the fingerprint Ht 3 H( M , N , Xt*) . 3. Extract the LSB from X, and decrypt the result using the public key, obtaining the decrypted block 0,. 4. Exclusive-or H, with D,, obtaining the check block C,. 5. If C, and A , are equal, the watermark is verified. Otherwise, the marked image X has been modified at block X,.
Notice that, theoretically, the image A must be publicly available for the verification to take place. In practice, however, A is a meaningful image and any change in X, will most likely generate a noise-like block C,, that cannot be mixed up with A,, even if A is not available (see figure 2). 
SIMPLE ATTACKS
We now point out some cryptanalytical weaknesses of Wong's method and suggest the means to make it robust'. Notice that an authentication scheme is really secure only if any change in the marked image is detectable, even if these changes cannot be seemingly used for any malicious purposes. The mere existence of such flaws indicates a weakness in the scheme. They may be used in the future to attack the watermarking, even though by now no one knows how to do it.
For example, a grayscale watermarking technique is usually generalized to color images by simply applying the method independently to the three color planes (for example, [I-21) . In this case, the watermarking will not detect the swapping of the color planes. Although it may be hard to imagine how this attack could be used maliciously, it is more secure that even this sort of alteration should not pass undetected. This concrete problem can be easily overcome by hashing together the three color planes.
We remark that 64-bit RSA, originally suggested for use with Wong's scheme, is completely insecure. RSA keys this size can be factored within seconds on a modem PC.
There is another very simple attack, undetectable by Wong's watermarking scheme, that can really be used with malicious intentions. We have named it a cut-and-paste attack. Suppose an attacker has a collection of legitimately watermarked images, all of them of the same size and containing the same embedded image A in the watermark: Since each block is marked separately without any further information about the container image except its dimensions, it is possible for this attacker to select blocks from the authentic images and build with them a new image whose watermark will be falsely verified as legitimate. Here we assume that the original coordinates of each -block are kept in the faked image. However, in some'-cases (for example, if the size of image A is 4x4, 4x8, 8x4,.8~8, 8x16, etc.) it might even be possible to cutand-paste within a marked ;image while keeping the embedded watermark unchanged. Figure 2 shows an example of this attack.
SIMPLE BIRTHDAY ATTACK
Birthday attacks [4, section 9.71 constitute a more sophisticated and powerful means of subverting digital signatures. The attacker searches for collisions, i.e. pairs of blocks that hash to the same value, thus having. the same signature. Using a hashing function that produces rn possible values, there is more than 50% chance of finding a collision:\whenever. about & blocks are available.
Wong's scheme:uses a hashing function of no more than 64 bits; hence collisions are'expecte8. to be found when the attacker has collected merely.about 232 blocks. In general, the only protection against birthdaytattacks is to increase the hash size. This would decrease the change localization resolution, because the blocks must be made lagerto host more embedded data. We will show in the next section.that HBCl makes a classical birthday attack impossible.
A possible scenario for a birthday attack is an insurance company that keeps an.incident image database using Wong's watermarking for image integrity and authenticity protection. A typical database of a large insurance company may contain over a million images with, say, 640x480 pixels, so that each image is partitioned into 4800 individually signed blocks (of 8x8 pixels). This results about 2" signatures, enough for a birthday attack.
The attack proceeds as follows. An attacker wishing to replace a watermarked block X , by another block B prepares r = 2 3 2 visually equivalent variants Ill,...$, of B. This can be accomplished by varying the second least significant bit of each of 32 arbitrarily chosen pixels of B (the LSB cannot be used since Wong's watermark will be stored there). The attacker then looks for an image block C in the image database that hashes to the same value as any one of the Bj, i.e., such that
H ( M , N , B ; ) = H ( M , N , c * ) .
The operator * indicates LSB clearing. The probability of success exceeds 0.5 because of the birthday paradox. This Bj (with the watermark taken from C ) can replace X, without being noticed by Wong's scheme. If this process is repeated a sufficient number of times, a whole faked image can be created.
HASH BLOCK CHAINING VERSION 1
As pointed out in [5-71, the solution to hinder cut-and-paste and birthday attacks is to introduce contextual information. That is, in the computation of the fingerprint H,, feed the hashing function H with the neighboring blocks of Zt* , besides the block Z ; itself (see figure 1) . In this case, if a block X, is altered, signature verification will fail in all those blocks that depend on X,, besides in block X, itself. Thus, a number as small as possible of dependencies is desirable for an accurate localization of image changes; ideally, a single dependency per block. The following scheme implements this idea:
Hf 3 H ( ,~,~, Z I . , Z ; f -l ) m o d n , f ) .
The block index f was inserted in order to detect blockwise rotation. We call this construction hush block chaining, version 1 (HBCl). We stress that if a block X, is altered, then HBCl will report that mod is invalid (besides X, itselo.
Using HBC1, the simple cut-and-paste attack can no more be perpetrated, because if a spurious block is pasted in place of X,, with very high probability this alteration will introduce a change in H(f+l) mod . The probability of such a change not taking place is only O(m-') . This change invalidates the signature of the block X(f+l)modn. Similarly, if a birthday attack is performed, the changed contents of X, induce with high probability a change in ff(t+l) mod . Thus, the ati.acker will have to forge the signature of X(t+l) modn as well, perpetrating another birthday attack. But this induces a change in ff(,+:l) mod . Therefore, the attacker will face the problem that bad signatures propagate cyclically over all blocks, eventually destroj,ing the forged signature of the very first faked block. original color image (a) was marked using the private key and a 32x32 logo image (b): yielding watermarked image (c). The image (d) shows its constituent blocks. The watermarked image (c) suffered a cut-and-paste attack (e), undetectable by Wong's scheme. Using HBC2, the altered blocks can be located (f). Notice that HBC2 detects only borders of changed 16x16 blocks.
TRANSPLANTATION ATTACK

IMPROVED BIRTHDAY ATTACK
HBCl cannot withstand a more sophisticated birthday attack either. This attack replaces simultaneously two consecutive blocks X, and Xt+, by forged blocks B, and B,] (we will omit "mod n" in the indices to simplify the notation.) Three fingerprints are affected by these substitutions: H, (which depends on X,), H,+, (which depends on both X, and Xr+,), and Ht+2 (which depends on X,+'). Suppose that the database has s signed blocks. The attacker prepares p visually equivalent variants for B, and q variants for B,'. Then, likelypslm collisions for H, and qslm collisions for Ht+, will be found (see 
HASH BLOCK CHAINING VERSION 2
We have improved HBCl to thwart both transplantation and improved birthday attacks. This enhanced version was named HBC2 and it makes use of nondefeminisfic signature schemes. Some signature schemes (for example, DSA and Schnorr's scheme [4, section 1 1.51) are nondeterministic in the sense that each individual signature depends not only on the hashing function, but also on some randomly chosen parameter. Using a nondeterministic signature algorithm, even the signatures of two identical images will be different. This property effectively prevents transplantation attacks. A deterministic signature (like RSA) can be converted into a nondeterministic one by appending "salt" (i.e., arbitrary, statistically unique data) to the message being signed. HBC2 is defined as follows:
where S, , is the nondeterministic signature of block Z,-l , and S-l = 0. Note that we cannot use S(t-l)modn because by the time Ho is being computed, Sn-, would not be known yet.
The improved birthday attack is completely ineffective against HBC2, because in HBC2 the signature of one block depends not only on the content of its neighboring block, but also on its nondeterministic signature. Let us suppose that an attacker has managed to replaced two valid consecutive blocks Xl and X1+] by two faked blocks B, and B,+,, and three signatures S,, SI+, and SI+, by three faked (but valid) signatures L,, L,+], Llf2 while maintaining intact the content of the block &+2. Note that this replacement is much harder for HBC2 than for HBCl due to the nondeterministic signature and the signature-dependency. Even in this improbable scenario, HBC2 will report an alteration, because H1+3 depends not only on the content ofXt+z, which is left untouched, but also on its signature, which almost certainly changes.
The use of HBC2 has a surprising side effect. Typically, birthday attacks can be mounted against hashing functions of length m with an effort of O(&) steps. However, for HBC2 no attack that takes less than O(m) steps is known. Therefore it seems that, in an optimistic scenario, the hash length could be cut in half while keeping the original security level. However, we don't recommend reducing the hash length until this conjecture is scrutinized in greater depth, as such a reduction might adversely affect the security of the signature algorithm itself.
HBC2 is capable of detecting whether any blocks have been changed, rearranged, deleted, inserted, or transplanted from a legitimately signed image. Besides, it either indicates which blocks were altered or, if their contents are valid, where the borders of the valid regions lie. We notice that the location capability is lost if a block is inserted or deleted, though even in this case HBC2 will correctly report the presence of some alteration.
DISCUSSIONS AND EXPERIENCES
Typically, the length of a discrete logarithm signature is about twice the length of the hash used [4, section 11.51. This is better than RSA signatures, whose length is always that of the public key. For instance, DSA signatures are 320 bits in length, while RSA signatures with equivalent security level must be about 1024 bits long. In this sense, Schnorr signatures are best suited for HBC2 [4, section 11.5.31, as they achieve maximum reduction in signature size and hence in the amount of data to be embedded in the host image.
Experiences with HBC2 using elliptic curve cryptography yielded signing and verifying times of about IO seconds on a Pentium-500, for 5 12x512 grayscale images. The change location uncertainty was smaller than 0.2% of the image area.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we advanced some more steps toward a really secure blockwise fragile authentication watermarking. We took Wong's algorithm and showed it to be insecure against attacks as simple as block cut-and-paste and the well-known birthday attack. We proposed the HBCl scheme, which counters these attacks by making the signature of each block depend on the contents of a neighboring block. Then we showed how HBC 1, as well as any scheme that augments the hashing input with the contents of neighboring blocks, is susceptible to the transplantation attack. We also presented a new improved birthday attack that does apply to HBC1. To thwart these attacks, we defined HBC2 using nondeterministic signature and signature-dependency, and argued its effectiveness against transplantation and improved birthday attacks. Finally, we discussed the advantages of using discrete logarithm signatures and presented some experimental data.
